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Professionalism has an idealistic dimension and an institutional
one. The idealistic dimension is the notion of voluntary commitment
to both client interests and public values. The institutional dimension is the ideal of self-regulation by the bar.
The idealistic dimension remains powerful. However disappointed
we are by the distance between the profession’s ideals and its members’ practices, these ideals continue to inspire valuable efforts. Various professional organizations are making admirable contributions
through pro bono representation of disadvantaged people, public
education, and disinterested law reform efforts in a range of areas,
such as litigation procedure, prisons, and judicial selection. Moreover, the bar’s ideals of public service provide the vantage point from
which the profession’s critics assess and propose improvements to its
practices.
The institutional dimension is another story. It is implausible in
principle and corrupt in practice. Its current manifestations are a set
of strained rationalizations for tawdry self-seeking. The cynicism
that the bar’s self-regulatory project induces in lay people spills over
to discredit the idealistic dimension. We could strengthen the appeal
of the idealistic dimension of professionalism by jettisoning the institutional one, or at least revising it substantially.
The core of the institutional dimension is private, monopolistic
regulation. Traditionally, professionals have sought to exempt themselves from the suspicion that conventionally attends private monopoly. But few disinterested observers have been persuaded. It is not
certain that the bar acts as a self-seeking monopolist, but in such
matters as admission to practice, the marketing of legal services, and
even conflict and disclosure norms, it seems unlikely that a selfseeking monopolist would have behaved any differently.
The most salient alternative to private monopolistic selfregulation is public regulation through state institutions. I think
* William and Gertrude Saunders Professor of Law, Stanford University. I gave a
version of this Article as the Mason Ladd Lecture at the Florida State University College
of Law in March, 2002. Thanks to Dean Donald Weidner, Rob Atkinson and the FSU community for their hospitality on that occasion.
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that some of the most promising recent developments in professional
responsibility have occurred through interventions of national public
institutions applying general legal norms in ways that have modified
or put pressure on the profession’s own norms. What comes to mind
is the Supreme Court’s striking down of various restrictions on admission and marketing under the free speech and federalism provisions of the Constitution.1 I am also thinking of the efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of Thrift Supervision to better align the professional commitment to confidentiality
with the public values reflected in fraud and misrepresentation doctrine.2
Nevertheless, we are especially sensitive these days to the limitations of state institutions as regulatory actors. And indeed, state institutions have been complicit in the regulatory abuses I attribute to
the bar. The bar’s exercise of its monopoly power has depended on
ratification by state judiciaries and legislatures. The kernel of plausibility in the idea of self-regulation is the implication that the state
is too remote, inflexible, and compromised to provide the full range of
institutional support for the idealistic aspects of legal professionalism. Moreover, the state is itself a monopolistic organization. To the
extent that the objections to the institutional premise of traditional
professionalism rest on its monopolistic rather than its private character, it seems most promising to consider non-monopolistic approaches, both public and private.
That is my plan. I first elaborate on the widely felt doubts about
monopolistic self-regulation. Then I consider the possibility of nonmonopolistic regimes for two of the most important areas—
certification for practice and professional discipline.
I. THE TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE
I should explain what I mean by monopolistic self-regulation and,
indeed, what I mean when I ask “Who Needs the Bar?” It may not be
immediately obvious what one means by “the bar” in the American
context.
The notion of self-regulation in the traditional conception is that
practitioners organize in a single collectivity to promulgate and en-

1. See infra note 5.
2. See In re Gutfreund, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,067 (Dec. 3, 1992); In re Carter
& Johnson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981); William H. Simon, The Kaye
Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and
Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998) (discussing the Office of Thrift Supervision efforts to discipline lawyers in the Savings and Loan scandal).
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force norms of good practice.3 Now, of course, no such organization
has ever existed in the United States. The American model departs
from the theoretical paradigm in two respects. First, the remission of
primary regulatory authority over lawyers to the states means that,
instead of a single over-arching association, we have more than fifty
separate sets of regulatory institutions. Second, our constitutional
arrangements forbid explicit delegation of regulatory power to private organizations. Thus, regulatory power at the state level resides
formally, not in organizations openly controlled by practitioners, but
in public institutions, most notably the judiciary.
Nevertheless, the image of the bar as a monopolistic selfregulatory organization has some descriptive power. Our arrangements are more complex, but their output looks very much like what
one would expect of the private monopolistic paradigm. Most of the
ethics rules adopted by our many jurisdictions are quite similar.
These rules in turn resemble those promulgated by the American Bar
Association (“ABA”), a private organization that is the closest we
come to a national lawyers’ collective. The ABA aspires to represent
the entire bar and in fact includes more than a third of it.
Moreover, within each state, organizations of practitioners have
powerful influence over admissions and professional responsibility
regulation. The “integrated” bars include all practitioners within the
state and often have explicitly delegated powers (subject to judicial
oversight). In states without integrated bars, inclusive voluntary bar
associations that purport to speak for practitioners throughout the
state play a strong role in both admissions and ethics rule-making
and enforcement.
The political structure of the states would seem to make judges
responsive to organized practitioners. Most state judges run for office
in elections in which the average voter has little information or interest. Often, local practitioners will be the largest constituency with
enough information or incentive to take an interest.
The legitimacy of this regulatory structure is currently under
tremendous pressure. The pressure arises from two basic problems.
The first problem is that this structure gives major influence to a
group with a strong conflict of interest. This seems most apparent
with respect to admission and marketing practices. The bar’s norms
have restricted admission and inhibited price and service competition. The bar has public rationales for these norms, but since a substantial range of its members have a selfish interest in them, nonlawyers tend to be skeptical.
3. E.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (Cornelia
Brookfield trans., 1957); A.M. Carr-Saunders, Professions, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOC. SCI. 476 (1934).
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There are other grounds for this skepticism. Bar leaders are occasionally caught discussing the admission and marketing restrictions
more or less openly as devices for insuring the economic welfare of
incumbent practitioners.4 Further ground for doubt appears when we
consider that, while these rules depend on controversial empirical
assumptions, the bar has never shown any interest in investigating
them. Would easier admission requirements—say two years of law
school instead of three—really lead to lower quality practice? Would
client interests be jeopardized if lawyers could practice with
nonlawyer partners? Would deterrence of illegality be decreased or
enhanced if confidentiality was cut back? The bar’s rules have been
premised for centuries on empirical assumptions about such matters,
but there is almost no research on any of them. The American Bar
Association supports an excellent research institution—the American
Bar Foundation—but it has never done any research on the factual
premises of the profession’s core commitments.
The recent history of federal court review of state exclusionary
practices in response to constitutional challenges is instructive and
troubling. The challenged practices include citizenship requirements,
residence requirements, in-state office requirements, requirements of
association with local counsel, and a panoply of restrictions on advertising and solicitation. When the courts demand more than minimal
rationality, the bar loses.5 The courts demand more when the practice impinges directly on an important federalism or free speech
value. In such situations, the bar must offer more than fanciful
speculation suggesting that there might be some legitimate policy
4. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (dismissing antitrust claim against Arizona based on such allegations under state action exemption).
5. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding
advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman,
487 U.S. 59 (1988) (stating that the limitation of “on motion” admission without bar exam
to residents violates privileges and immunities clause); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S.
466 (1988) (holding advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); Frazier v. Heebe,
482 U.S. 641 (1987) (stating that in-state office requirement for only non-residents violates
privileges and immunities clause); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 629
(1985) (holding advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); Supreme Court of
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (stating that the exclusion of non-residents violates the
privileges and immunities clause); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding advertising
prohibition to violate First Amendment); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding solicitation prohibition to violate First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (holding advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973) (stating that the exclusion of aliens violates equal protection clause); Baird
v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (stating that the requirement of submission to
broad examination of political associations violates First Amendment); In re Stolar, 401
U.S. 23 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (holding exclusion on
the basis of Communist Party membership and radical political activities violates First
Amendment); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exm’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding exclusion on the
basis of Communist Party membership and radical political activities violates First
Amendment).
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that under some not-totally-ridiculous but completely hypothetical
scenario would be rationally served by the rule. The courts demand a
policy with substantial plausibility and factual premises with some
empirical support. The bar almost always fails to deliver.6
When the values harmed by the practice are less constitutionally
salient, courts apply minimum rationality. Only a failure of imagination could lead to flunking this test. When the bar justifies its requirement that out-of-state lawyers affiliate with local counsel in
state court, even in cases under federal law, as a means of insuring
familiarity with local procedural rules, the courts accept this as
minimally rational.7 When the bar justifies its requirement that its
members have in-state offices as a means of assuring availability to
clients, this too will pass the test.8
These conclusions may follow from the minimum rationality standard, but we should not ignore the layers of implausibility this standard by-passes. First, the connections between local admission and
knowledge of local rules and between an in-state office and accessibility to clients are minor and wildly imprecise. It is likely that nearly
all practitioners affected by the exclusions would have learned the local rules and made themselves accessible without having to undertake the expense of associating with a second lawyer or opening an
in-state office.
Second, whatever benefits the exclusionary rules produce for clients have to be weighed against the costs they impose, which are ultimately borne by clients. The requirements raise the cost of lawyers
and reduce client choice among them. The bar, of course, makes its
6. The Court did hold a speculative rationale—the likelihood of undue pressure from
in-person solicitation—sufficient for more than minimal scrutiny in Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The only Supreme Court case I am aware of in which the
bar actually produced evidence that the Court deemed sufficient to satisfy greater-thanminimal scrutiny is Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). The evidence,
however, did not indicate that the advertising was harmful to clients, merely that it negatively affected “public perceptions” of the bar. The Court’s acceptance of this effect as a basis for a restriction of protected speech seems inconsistent with basic First Amendment
principles. See Am. Booksellers’ Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating in
the course of invalidating a pornography ordinance, that the tendency of the speech to induce negative perceptions of women is not a legitimate basis for regulation under the First
Amendment).
The Court also accepted the bar’s rationale that current Communist political associations
have some connection to fitness to practice law. See Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg
v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961). But such inquiries are rarely pursued today, and
at least one bar has come to regret the activities held permissible by the Court. David
Rani, 30 Years Have Passed But License Still Sought, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 8 (reporting that the Illinois State Bar Association petitioned the state supreme court to reconsider the 30-year old decision upheld in In re Anastaplo).
7. Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that the rule has “the air
of a guild restriction” but satisfies minimum rationality).
8. Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099 (3d Cir. 1997).
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decisions without any information on the comparative magnitudes of
the costs and benefits.
Third, in all such cases the bar has a choice of two approaches to
dealing with the problem. It can deal with them prophylactically by
excluding people or restricting practices it perceives have a tendency
to harm clients. Or it can deal with the problem through after-thefact sanctioning of bad practice. Lawyers who fail to comply with local court rules or to make themselves available to clients can be penalized. Thus, a plausible decision to adopt the exclusions would not
only have to weigh the costs and benefits of the exclusions, but also
compare them against the alternative of increasing after-the-fact enforcement. Of course, the bar does not do this, at least not explicitly
and systematically. The bar’s conflict of interest is severe here, since
the costs of exclusion are borne by outsiders, while after-the-fact enforcement sanctions members. And in fact, the indications are that
after-the-fact enforcement tends to be indulgent and lax.9
The second source of pressure on the traditional regulatory model
is the increased difficulty of formulating any principled delineation of
the professional monopoly. Our version of the traditional model requires both that we distinguish law practice from non-law practice
and that we assign particular instances of practice to particular
states. It gets harder every day to do either. Substantively, the bar is
hard pressed to explain why what lawyers can do in tax counseling is
or should be different from what accountants do, or why what lawyers can do in conveyancing is different or should be different from
what brokers and lay title searchers do. Even in litigation, once
within the paradigmatic core of the lawyering field, we find lay mediators performing work that is hard to distinguish from that which
lawyers do. In the areas that the federal agencies have opened to lay
practice—patents, immigration, and tax—lay practitioners have
flourished alongside lawyers.
The other aspect of the problem is the increasing extent to which
practice is either federal or multi-jurisdictional. The typical practice
of large firm business lawyers involves the law of numerous states
and requires travel to many states where they are not licensed. It is
commonly said that lawyers for large businesses routinely engage in
unauthorized practice, and under the stricter definitions of unauthorized practice, this is certainly true. But a more fundamental concern is the difficulty of formulating any coherent definition of intrastate practice that embraces any significant range of lawyering.
How do we decide in what state or states a particular act of
lawyering takes place? Clearly, the source of the relevant law is no
9. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 158-65 (2000).
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longer a plausible touchstone. It is too late in the day to say that a
lawyer needs to be a member of the bar of any state whose law she
gives advice about. Most experts on Delaware corporate law are not
members of the Delaware bar. They are scattered throughout the
country, the largest group of them being in New York. A broad range
of lawyering tasks require consideration of the law of many jurisdictions. No one suggests that a national securities offering requires
that fifty different lawyers give opinions on their respective states’
“blue sky” laws. Nor has there been a recommendation that a national publication needs to get its advice on libel from lawyers licensed in all of the jurisdictions where its product is distributed.
And, of course, with respect to federal law, no state could claim that
its lawyers are presumptively more qualified than out-of-state lawyers.
Recognizing this, the regulators are driven to focus on “presence”
and “contacts.”10 But most physical contacts are relevant only because they implicate some relevant law. Surely there is no reason,
other than that its law applies, for New Jersey to think that its own
practitioners are better qualified to do conveyances of in-state real
estate.
The one kind of contact or presence that might reflect a distinct
state interest is the residence of the client. A state might decide that
it had a special responsibility to protect its residents from bad
lawyering, regardless of what law applied to the problem in question.
But current doctrine is generally not consistent with such a policy. In
litigation, we apply the disciplinary rule of the place where the court
sits rather than the residence of the parties. In transactional work,
the key factor is the state where the lawyer is licensed.11
Moreover, the residence rationale fails to explain regulation of instate practice on behalf of non-resident clients. The New Jersey bar
insists, for example, that lawyers practicing in New Jersey maintain
a “bona fide” office within the state. It enforces this rule zealously
against lawyers based in Philadelphia who seek to represent clients
in New Jersey. The principal rationale for the rule is that an in-state
office assures that the lawyer will be available to clients. In fact,
however, it appears that most of the clients served by the Philadelphia-based lawyers are Pennsylvania residents—banks that do lend10. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.
1998) (analyzing whether there is “sufficient contact” with California to make practice by
non-member unauthorized primarily but not exclusively in terms of physical links); AM.
BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 16 (Aug.
2002), available at http//:www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/final_mjp_rpt_5-17.pdf (proposing a new
prohibition on unauthorized practice that precludes establishing a “systematic and continuous presence” in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not licensed) (last visited May 12,
2003) (on file with author).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2001).
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ing in New Jersey—who are best served by the lawyers’ out-of-state
offices.12
Note that the two aspects of the boundary problem push the bar in
opposite directions. The bar’s response to the fact that nonlawyers
practice competently in particular fields is to emphasize lawyers’
competence in broad skills of complex analysis that cut across fields.
Thus, it is the general analytical skills of lawyers that are said to be
the comparative advantage that they have over nonlawyers. This is
the general view of the ethics codes. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, conceding that lay practitioners may be able to apply
law in specialized fields, asserts that what lawyers have that lay
practitioners do not is “professional judgment.” It defines “professional judgment” as the “educated ability to relate the general body
and philosophy of the law to a specific legal problem of a client.”13
And the Model Rules assert that it is fine for lawyers to accept employment in an area in which they are unprepared, so long as they
intend to study up on it.14 The assumption is that lawyers are certified, not for knowledge of specific rules, but for a general aptitude
that covers any legal field.
By contrast, the response to the jurisdictional aspect of the problem is to emphasize the importance of particular competence in local
law. Thus, we are told that the reason out-of-state lawyers must affiliate with local counsel to appear pro hac vice in many state courts,
and even some federal courts, is that in-state lawyers have better
knowledge of local rules.15 A lawyer in any state is free to take on the
most complicated tax or securities matter without demonstrating any
prior knowledge of these bodies of law. But fear that lawyers might
not be able to master a handful of unfamiliar procedural rules is said
to warrant an exclusion that imposes substantial burdens and expenses.
It is difficult to see how the bar can have it both ways. If the “essence” of lawyering is, as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility asserts, “the ability to relate the general body and philosophy of
law to a specific legal problem,”16 then there is no reason why lawyers
12. Charles Toutant, N.J. Court Panel Balks at Shared Bona Fide Office, N.J. L.J.,
Oct. 29, 2001, at 1, 14.
13. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1981); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt., para. 2 (2001): “Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill
consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that
necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge.”
14. “A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. . . . A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt., para. 2 (2001).
15. E.g., Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1983).
16. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1981).
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should be required to demonstrate knowledge of any particular body
of law. On the other hand, if law is just a series of discrete specialties, then it is hard to distinguish what lawyers do within those specialties from what experienced nonlawyer practitioners do, and hence
hard to explain why they should or could have an exclusive right to a
certain scope of practice.
A striking fact of recent history is the increasing homogenization
of legal education and the admissions process. The trend in bar examinations for many decades has been away from testing local law to
testing general principles. National law schools consider it beneath
them to give systematic instruction in the law of any given jurisdiction. In most states, the Multistate Bar Exam counts for half or more
of an applicant’s score. Even the essay portions test mostly general
principles. For example, California, one of the most exclusive jurisdictions with a low bar pass-rate and almost no waive-in opportunities, tests virtually no local law. Review courses for the California
bar typically tell the student what the “prevalent view is,” and what
the “minority view” is; a star performer on the exam may have no
idea what the California view is on most of the questions tested.
In this situation, it is difficult to take seriously the idea that a
member of a particular state’s bar can be presumed to have a better
knowledge of its law—the principal rationale for the exclusion of outof-state lawyers.17
The recent report of the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional
Practice comes as close as possible to acknowledging the bankruptcy
of monopolistic regulation without abandoning it. “[T]here is no evidence,” the report concludes, that unauthorized practice in one state
by lawyers licensed in another “result[s] in the provision of incompetent representation.”18 Nevertheless, the Commission endorses the
clarification and re-affirmation of unauthorized practice prohibitions
for no better reason than that “a large segment of the bar” supports
it.19

17. The ABA’s Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice mentions two other rationales for exclusion—the possibility that members of a state’s bar will have better knowledge
of unwritten local customs that are relevant to effective practice and that members will be
more likely to engage in in-state pro bono activity. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 9.
These rationales were held insufficient to justify residence requirements against federalism-based constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274 (1985). Since the only remaining major entry barrier—the bar exam—is probably subject to a more deferential constitutional test, these rationales may be sufficient for that
purpose, but it is doubtful that they could survive disinterested, critical examination. The
bar exam has only the most speculative and attenuated relation to either goal, and if the
bar were serious about either, it could pursue them more effectively at less cost by testing
knowledge of local practice on the exam and by setting minimum pro bono requirements.
18. See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 10, at 6.
19. Id. The Report’s full explanation of its recommendation reads:
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If the bar were a private organization, its practices would be
struck down under the antitrust laws. What legitimacy they have is
due to their adoption by the state courts. But the courts seem to have
been a weak check on the economic self-seeking we readily impute to
private monopolists. They have no accountability to out-of-state interests. Within the state, it seems at least possible that they will be
more sensitive to the interests of highly organized practitioners than
to the more diffuse interests of clients. And the fact that the courts
have tended to more or less rubber stamp the output of the ABA and
the state associations strengthens such doubts.
So it seems promising to consider competitive approaches to regulation. I focus on two of the most important areas—admissions and
professional discipline. I consider an approach to admissions that involves competition among public authorities, and an approach to discipline that involves competition among private associations. But
there are many possible variations on each proposal, involving different mixes of public and private institutions.
II. A COMPETITIVE ADMISSIONS REGIME
Given the large extent to which practice involves federal law and
multi-state relationships, the case for federalization of lawyer regulation is a strong one. But the state-based regime might look more attractive if it were shorn of its monopolistic elements. At least, it is
worth considering what a non-monopolistic regime of admissions
would look like.
Some invoke the analogy of the driver’s license in discussing such
a regime. Taken literally, the analogy connotes a regime in which
each state accords those licensed in other states all the privileges accorded by the licensing state without imposing any additional qualifying conditions. No one proposes to go this far with lawyers, however; nearly all proposals contemplate some local requirements.20
Given the principle of state-based judicial regulation of the legal profession, the
assumptions underlying that principle, and the support of a large segment of
the bar for preserving it, the Commission believes that a stronger case would
have to be made that national law practice is essential and that a more measured approach will not suffice to facilitate law practice and to promote the public interest.
Although this may sound like three reasons, it is only one. In the conceded absence of
“evidence,” the “principle” of state monopolization and its underlying assumptions carry no
more weight than the competing principle of freedom of contract and its underlying assumptions. The conclusion thus rests only on the “support” of the bar. Note also how the
Commission, having failed to come up with any evidence to support the bar’s predisposition, insists without explanation that the burden of proof be placed on those who challenge
it.
20. Christine R. Davis, Comment, Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdictional Practice in Today’s Legal Profession, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1339, 1357-66 (2002).
Most proposals contemplate at least summary registration with the possibility of suspen-
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I find it useful to consider lawyer regulation in the light of another federalist analogy—corporate chartering. The corporate chartering regime involves a measure of reserved local power over out-ofstate licensees that seems closer to what reformers contemplate for
the legal profession. Moreover, a large literature on corporate chartering has sensitized us to the potential advantages of competitive
state regulation in this area.21
Finally, the corporate regime is also interesting because the Supreme Court has indicated that the Constitution limits monopolistic
regulation in this area.22 The Court summarily rejected suggestions
that there are comparable limits on monopolistic regulation of the legal profession, but the arguments for Constitutional limitation seems
at least as strong with the legal profession, and the Court may some
day reconsider its casually-taken prior position.23
To an even greater extent than the legal profession, businesses
that assume the corporate form have become increasingly multistate
and increasingly subject to federal regulation. Yet, here, as with law
and other occupations, our system has not moved toward federalization of the basic regulatory regime. The states retain primary responsibility for corporate chartering. Yet, the corporate model is one
of competitive rather than monopolistic federalism.
In this model, each state permits corporations chartered by other
states to conduct business within the state, subject to conditions taision or revocation of the right to practice locally for in-state disciplinary violations. The
European Union has such a system. American states that permit summary registration of
attorneys licensed out-of-state typically condition registration on some period of practice in
the licensing state and on licensing state reciprocity toward its own lawyers.
21. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO
L. REV. 709 (1987).
22. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
23. The authority is sparse and ambiguous. In Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v.
Beatty, 423 U.S. 1009 (1975), aff’g mem. 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill. 1975), the Court summarily affirmed a district court opinion suggesting there are no constitutional limits on
state court decisions regarding admission pro hac vice in cases involving federal rights. In
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979), it rejected another constitutional challenge to a state
court denial of admission pro hac vice in a case involving federal rights. The Court’s opinion in Leis focuses on and rejects the claim that the lawyer has a federal constitutional
right to state court admission pro hac vice. It addresses the more important claim of
whether the claimant (client) has a right to have the attorney of his choice admitted only in
a brief response to a dissenting opinion with a conclusory reference to the Norfolk & Western opinion. The dissent in Leis had invoked the contention in a Second Circuit opinion by
Judge Friendly that “under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution no
state can prohibit a citizen with a federal claim or defense from engaging an out-of-state
lawyer to collaborate with an in-state lawyer and give legal advice concerning it within the
state.” Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 1966).
Where the client is not asserting a federal right, the constitutional claim would be that
the restriction unreasonably burdens interstate commerce, as in Edgar v. MITE. However,
given the Court’s deference to state regulatory interests in the Norfolk & Western and Leis
cases and in occupational regulation cases in general, the prospects of such a claim seem
dim.
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lored to local needs. These conditions are usually minimal. The foreign corporation must pay fees and subject itself to suit in the state’s
courts. Most states demand little more. In particular, while the
states apply local law to the local activities of the corporation that affect outsiders to the corporation, they tend to defer to the chartering
state in enforcing protections for shareholders.24
A few, however,—notably California and New York—do.25 They
impose some restrictions from their own corporate law designed to
protect local shareholders. These provisions are narrowly tailored,
however. Only a few provisions deemed important are imposed, and
they are limited to corporations whose investors and/or operations
are concentrated within the state. Moreover, they typically exempt
publicly traded corporations, without regard to whether their shareholders are concentrated within the state. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the commerce and privileges-and-immunities clauses of
the Constitution to preclude the states from going much farther than
this. But most states have seen no need to approach the limits of constitutional power in this matter. Thus, within the typical state, the
protection accorded in-state corporate shareholders in a foreign corporation is usually the law of the chartering state.
Although many would prefer a regime of federal chartering, there
is an argument that a competitive federal regime has an advantage
over a national one. If corporate promoters or managers have a
choice of regimes and if shareholders are sensitive to the variations
among them, then promoters or managers have a reason to seek out
regimes that shareholders regard as superior. A solid legal regime
increases the value of the corporation to shareholders and hence the
price they are willing to pay for shares. State governments desiring
to attract incorporations, in order to get revenues or prestige, will
have reasons to make their protections of shareholders effective, and
the competitive process will penalize those who fail. The extent to
which the process functions this way is controversial, but the corporate chartering regime clearly enjoys considerably more legitimacy
and respect than the very different state-based regime of lawyer licensing.
There is one element of the current regulatory regime for lawyers
that corresponds to the corporate regime. In professional responsibility cases, states adopt a choice-of-law approach that looks to the licensing state’s norms for most purposes.26 However, since states ex24. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 229-35 (3d ed.
1983).
25. Id. at 189-99.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2001). The main exception is for litigation practice, where the jurisdiction in which the court sits controls. Id. Note that, to the
extent that the choice of law rule looks to the licensing state’s norms with respect, not just
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tensively prohibit in-state practice by foreign lawyers, the choice-oflaw norm is of limited importance. We can easily imagine, however, a
lawyer regime developed along the corporate chartering model.
In it, each state would be obliged to permit lawyers licensed by
other states to practice within the state subject to narrowly tailored
restrictions designed to protect specifically identified local interests.
It would, for example, be appropriate to require foreign lawyers, like
foreign corporations, to consent to the adjudication of claims by local
citizens before local tribunals. It would be appropriate to require
minimum levels of liability insurance coverage. And a state might
require special qualification by way of study or examination, but only
with respect to genuinely local practice.
Thus, for example, it might in theory be appropriate to require, as
a condition of practicing conveyancing or divorce within the state, an
exam focused on the particular subject in question. I say “in theory”
because, in fact, I doubt if most states, acting in good faith, would
find any need for such protections, just as most do not find any need
for specific protections for local shareholders of foreign corporations.
After all, under the current regime, states do not condition the right
to practice in most areas on specific testing in these areas. Many local practice areas are not tested at all on the bar exams, and none
are tested more than cursorily. Nevertheless, restricting conditions
to those focused on local matters in this manner would focus regulation on the areas of at least potentially legitimate state interest.
Moreover, it is possible that testing focused on specific areas of practice in which the particular lawyers are about to engage would induce more valuable preparation than the once-over-lightly approach
of the current exams.
In the competitive federalist regime, consumers within each state
would face a choice of lawyers licensed in many different states for
most services. Lawyers would be required to make clear at the outset
where they had been licensed. The market might develop so that consumers could usefully take account of variations in state certification
regimes. Some states might acquire a reputation for especially high
general standards; some might acquire reputations for effective emphasis on certain areas of practice. Some states might compete to become the premier national brand, like Delaware in corporate law.
Other states might focus on perceived local needs. A rural state like
North Dakota, for example, might focus on small business skills. One
could imagine that Florida might focus on estate planning, among
other subjects.

to the protection of clients, but to the protection of third parties, it goes beyond the corresponding corporate norm, and is, I would submit, unjustifiable.
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To the extent that state certifications send useful but varying signals about lawyer quality and preparation, there is every reason to
think that sophisticated clients would be able to take account of such
information. Even unsophisticated clients might, with the help of
consumer rating services, be able to make meaningful distinctions
among different regimes. The legal needs of unsophisticated clients
tend to fall predominantly in a small number of categories, such as
personal injury, divorce, and estate planning. Cross-state comparisons in quality of training might yield information that would be accessible to consumers.
No doubt some will fear a “race to the bottom” in which some
states try to earn revenues by certifying poorly qualified candidates
under easy standards and then export them to prey on out-of-staters.
But reputation would seem a strong obstacle to this course in two respects. First, consumers would shy away from lawyers certified in
the low-standards jurisdictions. Second, the better-qualified local
practitioners in the low-standards state would feel degraded by the
poor reputation of the local bar, and would likely push to change it.
If a state found that its citizens were victimized by low-quality
foreign practitioners, it could, as I have suggested, act by establishing local standards with respect to genuinely local issues. But the restrictions ought to be narrowly tailored to clearly identified local interests.
III. A COMPETITIVE DISCIPLINARY REGIME27
Turn now to the ethical rules that protect third party and public
interests. Critics within the profession, and most lay people, consider
that the bar’s rules on confidentiality and zealous advocacy excessively sacrifice third party and public interests to client interests.
They require or permit lawyers to withhold material information in
situations where withholding may contribute to substantial injustice,
and they even require or permit lawyers to actively obfuscate in some
circumstances, for example, attempting to discredit witnesses they
know are testifying truthfully.
While the general public seems not to share the bar’s commitment
to strict confidentiality and aggressive advocacy, these rules are less
often seen as an expression of economic self-interest than the rules
specifically focused on admission and marketing. Critics are as likely
to explain the bar’s ethical orientation in terms of ideological commitments as in terms of economic self-interest.

27. Here I draw on some suggestions I made in WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 202-14 (1998). See also Richard W. Painter, Rules
Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665 (2001).
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And in fact, the bar’s economic interests are ambiguous. On the
one hand, strong confidentiality and aggressive advocacy enable lawyers to promise prospective clients that they will pursue their interests aggressively, even at the cost of injustice to others. This
undoubtedly appeals to many clients. On the other hand, these
norms may impair lawyers’ ability to serve other clients. Much of
what lawyers do involves efforts to induce either state officials or
private third parties to rely on their clients—that is to credit their
claims and assertions or to trust them enough to enter into relations
of mutual dependence with them. Strong confidentiality and advocacy norms limit such efforts. The client of the lawyer who adopts an
ethic of minimal third party and public responsibility will pay a price
in terms of diminished trust by third parties and officials. The client
gets the benefit of zealous advocacy relatively unconstrained by
commitment to anything but the unambiguous commands of the
positive law. But she may experience more wariness on the part of
the people she is dealing with. These people may be inclined to insist
on more substantiation of factual representation or more specification of contractual terms to protect against the higher danger of opportunism from the client who opts for low commitment ethics. In
marginal cases, private parties may refuse to enter into relationships
that would enter with a higher degree of trust, and public officials
may exercise their discretion against the client simply because they
feel unable to credit the lawyer’s representations.
So, it is less clear whether the ethics rules reflect economic selfinterest. Nevertheless, as with the admission and marketing rules,
the ethics rules rest on debatable empirical assumptions that the bar
tends not to analyze rigorously and has never sought to investigate
factually. For example, does strong confidentiality promote compliance with law by inducing more disclosure to lawyers, thus enabling
lawyers to give advice that encourages compliance? Or does it undermine compliance by reducing disclosure by lawyers, thus depriving lawyers of leverage to induce compliance and precluding enforcers from acting on the information? Obviously, the rule must have
both effects. It increases compliance in some cases by increasing disclosure to lawyers, and it reduces compliance in others by reducing
disclosure by lawyers. Whether strong confidentiality is legitimate
depends on which effect is greater. But the bar’s premise that the
pro-compliance effect dominates is based on nothing more than faith.
It has no evidence on the matter and has never sought to acquire
any.
One of the virtues of a competitive regime is that it would enable
us to observe and compare the effects of alternative regimes. Regulators would have a range of information on effects that they do not
now have.
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Let us try to imagine what a competitive regime would look like
with respect to such rules. Where the lawyer negotiates on behalf of
clients with third parties, the parties might agree contractually to
adopt a particular set of ethical rules for the transaction. When the
lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency, she might simply indicate to the tribunal or agency what level of ethical responsibilities to
the tribunal or agency she was committing herself to. Some lawyers
might opt for the current regime of the ABA rules, with its low level
of commitment to third-party and public interests. Others might opt
for ethics reflecting a high level of commitment to third party and
public interests, one requiring them to volunteer material information, for example.
In this way, individual lawyers could tailor their ethical commitments to particular clients or clienteles, and third parties could adjust accordingly. Moreover, one can imagine tribunals and agencies
might adjust their conduct in accordance with an advocate’s level of
commitment. Judges would be less apt to accept the informal assurances of low-commitment lawyers, and more wary about drawing inferences from their presentations at trial. Agencies might focus more
enforcement resources on verifying the presentations of lowcommitment lawyers. The IRS, for example, might consider the level
of ethical commitment of a taxpayer’s preparer or advisor in allocating its auditing resources.
If it could work, such a regime would be both efficient and fair. It
would be efficient because it would enable those with whom the lawyer deals to allocate their efforts to counter deception and opportunism more rationally. They would have better information about the
degree to which they could plausibly trust a lawyer or correspondingly the degree to which they should devote resources toward protection against opportunism. It would be fair because it would facilitate protective and enforcement activity in ways that would better
vindicate the substantive law. Deception and opportunism would
succeed less often, which would enhance fairness. Clients of lowcommitment lawyers would pay the price of increased wariness, but
this seems entirely fair. The current situation in which lawyers are
presumed to commit only to a low level of third-party obligation is
unfair to clients who would be willing to bind themselves to a higher
level. They currently pay a penalty because it is harder to distinguish
them from low-commitment clients. A competitive regime would
remedy this unfairness. Each client would receive the level of trust
appropriate to the ethical commitment she was willing to make.
If such a regime would be both efficient and fair, you might ask
why we do not have it already. The current regime does not preclude
private parties from contracting for a higher level of ethical commitment than the minimum one required by the ABA rules, and many
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tribunals and agencies would have the power to enact rules forcing
lawyers who practice before them to declare the level of commitment
they would commit to. In fact, we do occasionally see private contracts over such matters as disclosures. Think, for example, of a “10b5 opinion” in a securities dealing, in which the lawyer warrants that,
as far as she knows, no material information has been withheld.
Nevertheless, we see little of this kind of activity.
There are a variety of reasons why such a regime has not arisen,
even though it might be efficient and fair. Let me mention three
problems, each of which might be remediable through public-spirited
intervention.
First, issues of ethical commitment may be part of the category of
issues research suggests that psychological inhibitions impede people
from recognizing and raising. Summarizing some of this literature,
Melvin Eisenberg suggests that people may not negotiate contractual
safeguards against opportunism because they tend to be overly optimistic and insensitive to remote, hypothetical contingencies.28 Ethical
issues also have an emotional charge that may generate anxiety. Because to doubt someone’s ethics is sometimes taken as a negative
judgment on her character, a person may feel that simply raising the
issue of ethical commitment will be perceived by the other as offensive.
The second problem arises from the costs of communicating about,
negotiating, and drafting contracts. In order for a lawyer to find out a
client’s preference on the matter, the lawyer has to explain to the client what a high commitment ethic would mean. In order to negotiate
over whether to adopt a high commitment ethic, two parties have to
arrive at some understanding of what it would mean. If they want to
agree that each of them will act in accordance with the highest ethical standards, they can’t simply write a covenant promising to adhere to “the highest ethical standards.” They cannot be sure that
they both agree about what the “highest ethical standards” are, or
even if they do agree, they cannot be sure that in the event of a later
dispute, an enforcement authority would know what their understanding was. So, first with their clients and then with opposing lawyers, lawyers would have to spend a lot of time discussing what these
standards were and how they applied across the range of situations
that might arise in their relationship between the parties. Once they
arrived at an understanding, they would have to write out this understanding in a form intelligible to a court or other enforcement authority. This process would be costly and time-consuming, too costly
and time-consuming for most situations.
28. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 251-52 (1995).
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In many areas, the legal system responds to this problem by providing default terms or optional terms that parties can use to fill in
the gaps in their contracts. Private associations also provide standard form contracts designed to obviate the costs of elaborating
terms for each deal. In the professional responsibility field, however,
there is really only one standard form contract in each jurisdiction—
the ABA Model Rules or Code. The problem is not that deviation is
not permitted from the Rules or Code. Although many of the rules
are mandatory, most of them simply provide a floor; they don’t preclude contracting for a higher level of commitment. But they do not
do anything to reduce the costs of elaboration of these terms. Parties
can have the low-commitment default terms of the ABA rules for free
without doing anything. If they want higher standards, they have to
assume the costs of explaining and drafting themselves.
My colleague Michael Klausner has suggested the preference of
public corporations for Delaware’s corporation law might reflect, not
the substantive superiority of Delaware law, but simply the fact that
people are widely familiar with it and it is more extensively elaborated than other states’ laws. Because opting into Delaware’s rules
saves communication, negotiation, and drafting costs, people may
choose it even though they don’t especially like its substance.29 It’s
possible that the same thing accounts for the failure to draft out of
the ABA rules.
And third, we have the problem of enforcement. People will negotiate for a particular level of commitment only if they expect compliance with the negotiated standard, and compliance usually requires
some enforcement apparatus. Tribunals and agencies will usually
have some enforcement powers that they can devote to punishing defections from disciplinary commitments. Moreover, private actors
who encounter each repeatedly can informally sanction defectors by
refusing to trust them in later encounters. But where people encounter each other only once or sporadically, enforcement will be a problem. It would be easy enough to make some right of action in court
available in contract or tort. But the high costs of enforcement in
conventional damage suits would often not be warranted by the
provable and recoverable damages. This, of course, is one of the reasons we supplement common law enforcement of ethical duties with
disciplinary enforcement by the agencies of the bar. But these agencies, at present, are only available to enforce the low-commitment
ethics of the ABA rules.
The project of competitive ethical regimes could be advanced by
reforms designed to mitigate each of these difficulties. First, we need
29. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
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rules that force the parties to focus on and make commitments regarding ethical standards. It would be easy enough for tribunals and
agencies to require those who practice before them to indicate their
type or level of commitment, either categorically or on a case-by-case
basis. The Rules currently require lawyers to force the client to address the level of fees at the outset of the relation. In a similar manner, they could require lawyers to raise the issue of ethical commitment with both client and opposing counsel.
Second, to mitigate the costs of communication, negotiation, and
specification, we need publicly subsidized alternative ethical codes.
These codes need to be sufficiently elaborated so that, once chosen,
they provide an array of relatively clear answers to a broad range of
contingencies. These alternative codes would provide sets of norms
that lawyers and clients could adopt without having to assume the
costs of communication and drafting. They could, for example, take
the form of a Restatement. Unfortunately, the American Legal Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers does not fill the bill
at all. Like most of the Restatements, this one is largely concerned
with summarizing the dominant tendencies of established lowcommitment doctrine. It thus reinforces the tendency to opt for this
doctrine simply because it is easiest to do so. What we really need are
comparably clear and developed but strongly differentiated codes
that increase the range of ethical options.
Here there may be a promising role for specialized bar associations, and it is heartening to see some rising to the challenge. To
date, the outstanding example appears to be the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers.30 The Academy is a national association of
great prestige to which some of the most distinguished practitioners
belong. One of its many projects is the promulgation of a code of advocacy that explicitly “aspires to a level of practice above the
minimum established in the [Rules of Professional Conduct].”31 The
Academy’s rules take a familiar code form, with principles followed
by elaborative comments and illustrative cases. Many of its precepts
seem to depart notably from the ABA rules. For example, one provides, “[a]n attorney should not permit a client to contest child custody . . . for . . . financial leverage.”32 Another condemns “avoidance of
compliance with discovery through overly narrow construction of in-

30. Information regarding the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers can be
found on the Internet at www.aaml.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
31. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY
LAWYERS, Preliminary Statement (Nov. 2000), at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of%20
Advocacy/Bounds%20of%20Advocacy.htm (last visited May 12, 2003) (on file with author).
32. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY
LAWYERS R. 6.2 (Nov. 2000), at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of%20Advocacy/Bounds
%20of%20Advocacy.htm (last visited May 12, 2003) (on file with author).
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terrogatories or requests for production.”33 More activity of this kind
could significantly expand the range of choice and the potential for
ethical competition.
The Academy, however, does not directly respond to the enforcement problem. It does not sanction members for violation of its
norms. There is no practical obstacle to its doing so. Private associations have the power of expulsion, as well as fines and reprimands,
that can be effective deterrents. It would also be possible for the existing public enforcement agencies to enforce private codes to the extent that lawyers have made particular commitments to them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lest my suggestion that we may not need “the bar” be taken as an
aspersion on lawyer associational activity in general, I want to emphasize that I think there is a lot of valuable associational activity
going in many areas, including that of professional responsibility.
The work of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers ethics
code is just one example. We need more of this kind of work, as well
as other kinds fostering pro bono representation, public education,
peer support, and law reform. Such activities could be, and to a large
extent are, undertaken by voluntary bar associations without the direct assistance of monopolistic state power. The “bar,” the need for
which is now in doubt, is the monopolistic bar that seeks to occupy a
broad field exclusively with a single set of mandatory standards.

33. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY
LAWYERS R. 7.8 cmt. (Nov. 2000), at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of%20Advocacy/
Bounds%20of%20Advocacy.htm.

